Criminal Law Exercise Eye for an Eye

 


Andrew is sentenced to death for torture. In Andrew’s state, an “eye-for-an-eye” statute mandates punishment that mimics the defendant's crime. Pursuant to this statute, Andrew will be tortured to death. Is the state’s eye-for-an eye statute constitutional under the Eighth Amendment? Why or why not? (3.6.9).
Criminal Law Exercise #2: The Menendez Brothers
Review the case of Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012 (2005). The links to the case are in the Introduction to Criminal Law book (5.2.6). After reviewing all relevant materials, answer the following question. Your response must be in APA format.
Do you think the Menendez case should have been treated as a "battered child syndrome" case, easing the requirement of imminence and allowing jury instruction on imperfect self-defense? Why or why not?
 

Sample Answer

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In accordance with your request, I will address the constitutionality of the "eye-for-an-eye" death penalty statute and then analyze the application of the "battered child syndrome" defense in the context of the Menendez v. Terhune case.

 

⚖️ Eighth Amendment Analysis of the "Eye-for-an-Eye" Statute

 

The state’s "eye-for-an-eye" statute, which mandates that Andrew be tortured to death as punishment for torture, is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" (U.S. Const. amend. VIII).

Why the Statute is Unconstitutional

 

The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit two distinct categories of punishment that are relevant here:

Barbarous Methods of Execution/Punishment: The clause historically and currently prohibits methods of punishment that involve torture or unnecessary cruelty, even if the death penalty itself is constitutionally permissible (Karge, 1978; In re Kemmler, 1890, as cited in Baze, 2008). The Court has held that the Eighth Amendment forbids "punishments of torture and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, such as disemboweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning alive, all of which share the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain" (Smith, 2024). A punishment is considered "cruel" if it involves torture or a lingering death—something more than the mere extinguishment of life (Karge, 1978; Ewer, 1980; Smith, 2024). Torturing a prisoner to death, regardless of the crime, falls squarely into the category of "barbarous" punishments that were explicitly meant to be banned by the Eighth Amendment.

Disproportionate or Excessive Punishment: The punishment must not be excessive in relation to the crime committed (Goldstone, 2018; Karge, 1978). While the lex talionis concept of "an eye for an eye" was historically viewed as a limit on the upper bounds of retribution, the modern interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is based on evolving standards of decency (Goldstone, 2018; Karge, 1978). The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that a punishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it "is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime" (Goldstone, 2018). While the crime of torture is heinous, the state’s mandated use of torture to carry out the sentence of death would be a punishment method that is excessive and fails to make any measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment—retribution and deterrence—beyond the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering (Goldstone, 2018).

In sum, while the death penalty for murder (or, by extension, torture resulting in death) is not per se unconstitutional, the specific method of torturing the defendant to death is a form of torture that constitutes a barbarous and unconstitutional method of execution prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

 

👨‍👩‍👦‍👦 Criminal Law Exercise #2: The Menendez Brothers

 

 

The Application of Battered Child Syndrome and Imperfect Self-Defense

 

The question of whether the Menendez v. Terhune case should have been treated as a "battered child syndrome" case, easing the requirement of imminence and allowing a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense, is a complex legal and academic debate.